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$700,000.00 FOR COMPANIONSHIP
By OMAR E. GARWOOD, of the Denver Bar
C OLONEL LANKERSHIM was an old-time and wealthy
resident of Los Angeles. After his death one Irene
Herbert, alias Mrs. Edres Herbert, made claim against
the estate for $500,000.00 and interest, basing her case upon
an extraordinary piece of paper resembling a draft or check,
a photographic print of which appears on page 224 of 71
Pacific 2nd. It bore the Colonel's signature, and apparently
called for the payment to her of this extraordinary sum of
money one month atfer his death. Payment being refused,
the claimant brought suit, and in her quest for a consideration
she set up services as companion, assisting in dressing and
undressing the old gentleman, consoling and nursing him, and
protecting him from designing persons.
A Los Angeles jury awarded her the full amount, which
with interest mounted up to $700,000.00, and when the
District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, it appeared
that Irene's $700,000.00 was surely in the bag. The Su-
preme Court of California, however, chose to view the trans-
action with most scrutinizing jealousy and arrived at the con-
clusion that it was against a designing Irene that the Colonel
most needed protection; in a 37-page opinion it reversed the
case under such terms that it will never be retried, and all hope
of compensation for these questionable services has evapo-
rated.
The case is of interest to Denver lawyers who remember
Edward L. Auslender, a member of the Colorado bar, who
moved to Los Angeles in 1930 and became one of the attor-
neys for the Lankershim Estate, and of special interest is the
spectacular testimony of scientists on the subject of inks, dye
and ink absorptions, as well as handwriting experts such as
Dr. Robert S. Osborne of New York, James Clark Sellers
of the University of Southern California, Dr. Hendrikson of
the Huntington Library, and Professor Briton of the Depart-
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ment of Analytical Chemistry of the University of Southern
California. They gave very convincing opinions to the effect
that the small checks or draft written by none other than the
venturesome Irene herself, was materially altered after the
Colonel's signature had been executed; the spreading of ink at
the creases disclosed that important words had been written
in after the instrument had been folded, and the experts were
able to show clear instances where ink on the creases had pene-
trated through to the back of the instrument. Blotting of
words and figures also played an important part in their testi-
mony, and convincingly led to the conclusion that the paper
had originally been written for $500.00, and subsequently
raised to $500,000.
As elsewhere, the appellate courts of California are re-
luctant to interfere with a judgment entered by a fact-finding
body where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence, but
in this instance the court followed the rule that a mere con-
flict of words is not sufficient and as respects appellate review,
the contrary evidence must be of a substantial character such
as reasonably supports the judgment; that while jurors are
the sole judges of facts, the question of there being substan-
tial evidence to support a plaintiff's case is one of law for the
court, and in determining such question the credulity of the
courts is not to be deemed commensurate with the facility or
vehemence with which a witness swears.
The Estate set up numerous defenses, among which were
that material alterations were made after execution, that fraud
and deceit were practiced by a comely woman upon an old
man in failing health at a time when waning faculties had
rendered him unable to resist the wiles and importunities of
designing persons, tampering and raising thefigures in a writ-
ten instrument, lack of consideration and grossly inadequate
consideration. The instrument discloses that the fifth cipher
differs quite pronouncedly from the other ciphers in size, pen
pressure, formation and color intensity, indicating that the
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figures were originally $500.00, and were raised by adding
one new cipher and making the period resemble a comma so
as to read $500,000. The last cipher shows that it was
blotted immediately after being written, while the other
ciphers show no blotting, indicating that the last cipher was
added some time after the original figures were written.
Mrs. Herbert had plenty of friends to testify to numerous
conversations with the Colonel during his lifetime, and one
of them who claimed to have been present when the instru-
ment was signed and delivered, performed the miraculous
economic feat on the witness stand of reproducing word for
word an instrument most peculiar in its phraseology which
she had heard read but once, and which had not been seen or
discussed by her or anyone else in her hearing for the full
period of five years. This was too much for the Supreme
Court of California; it could not put trust in such remark-
able feats of memory.
ENDORSING NAMES OF WITNESSES ON
INFORMATIONS
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar
M EMBERS of committees on Criminal Procedure have
laboriously searched for defects in the administra-
tion of criminal justice in order to have some reform
to recommend or "report" to make to a bar association. Yet
there is one obvious imperfection in our code that seems to
have been ignored. It is the requirement that names of wit-
nesses be endorsed on the information or indictment. The
necessity for that practice hampers and burdens the prosecu-
tion without giving any substantial benefit to an innocent
accused.
If the accused is guilty, he does not deserve the statutory
aid or favor. If he is innocent, he derives little, if any, help
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